The participation of renewable, energy storage, and resources with limited fuel inventory in electricity markets has created the need for optimal scheduling and pricing across multiple market intervals for resources with intertemporal constraints. In this paper, a new two-level multi-period market model is proposed to enhance the efficiency of markets with such type of resources. It is also the first market design model that considers the coordination between a forward market and a spot market under the multi-period paradigm, achieving reliability, economic efficiency and dispatch-following incentives simultaneously. The upper level market solves a multi-period model with a long look-ahead time horizon whereas the lower level market solves a series of multi-period scheduling and pricing problems with a shorter look-ahead time horizon on a rolling basis. By using the upper-level schedules and opportunity costs of intertemporal constraints as a guideline, the lower level market model is able to produce economically efficient dispatch solutions as well as prices that incentivize dispatch following under the perfect forecast condition. The proposed scheme is applied to the dispatch and pricing of energy storage resources. Numerical experiments show that the proposed scheme outperforms the traditional myopic method in terms of economic efficiency, dispatch following and reliability. Index Terms-Multi-period scheduling and pricing, intertemporal constraint, energy storage, ramping I. NOMENCLATURE Parameters , gt
NTERTEMPROAL constraints are inherent to almost all the resources participating in electricity markets today. For instance, every generating unit has a ramp rate, which limits the change of generation output within a certain period. Energy storage resources, such as batteries and large pumped storage resources, have limited amount of energy to be stored, which limits the amount of charge and discharge in each operating cycle. Units such as oil, pipeline constrained gas fired, and pondage hydro units, may have limited fuel inventories and emission limits, which prevent them from operating at their full capacity all the time for the entire operating day.
Intertemporal constraints couple the electricity markets in different time intervals. The market outcome in one market interval may affect another. The tightness of such temporal market coupling depends on many factors, such as the load shape and resource mix. For example, if the load is relatively flat, or the system has many resources with fast ramping capability or high level of energy storage, the market coupling is loose most of the time. Because few time intervals are constrained by the intertemporal linkages under this scenario, market participants can easily identify these coupling time intervals and internalize the opportunity cost of such temporal limitation into their bids. The market would in general still achieve a high level of efficiency. However, several recent industry trends have invalidated such promise.  The integration of a large amount of renewable resources introduces both uncertainty and variability into electricity markets. The traditional load shape has changed dramatically. The most prominent phenomenon is that a large amount of PV installation transformed the load shape into a "duck curve" [1] , which shows a deep midday drop in net load, and requires more ramping capacity from conventional units to cope with steep changes of the net load. Consequently, market intervals are constrained by the intertemporal linkages more frequently, making it difficult for market participants to identify these coupling intervals and internalize the corresponding opportunity costs into their bids.  The states' effort to pursue their renewable portfolio standards helps spur a large amount of energy storage resources (ESRs) [2] - [4] . Compared to the conventional A Multi-Period Market Design for Markets with Intertemporal Constraints Jinye Zhao * , Member, IEEE, Tongxin Zheng * , Senior Member, IEEE, and Eugene Litvinov * , Fellow, IEEE I 2 large pumped-storage resources, the emerging storage technologies, such as batteries and flywheels, tend to be small, and cannot provide sustainable energy for a long time. On the other hand, they are flexible in terms of switching between charge and discharge, so they are capable of running many charge/discharge cycles per day. However, the outcomes of self-scheduling of these ESRs may not be efficient or reliable due to the dynamics in the real-time market. An alternative would be ISO-scheduling, which requires the storage intertemporal constraints to be explicitly considered in the ISO-scheduling and pricing processes.  As the nation becomes more and more relying on the natural-gas-fired units that are largely connected to the gas pipelines rather than having local gas storage, fewer and fewer units in the market are equipped with on-site fuel storage. Thus, disruptions on gas pipeline systems can have a significant impact on the reliable operation of the power system [5] . The value of fuel storage becomes more prominent, and optimal scheduling of these resources across different market intervals is critical. The above industry trends highlight the implication of intertemporal linkages for optimal operation of power systems and call for careful studies of scheduling and pricing methods or market designs for markets with intertemporal constraints.
III. PRIOR WORK AND CONTRIBUTIONS
All the ISOs in the U.S. run a day-ahead (DAM) and realtime market (RTM). The DAM, a forward market, typically contains 24 market periods, and it solves a multi-period unit commitment problem, respecting intertemporal constraints. The DAM clearing prices that are simultaneously determined by solving a 24-hour market clearing model reflect intertemporal opportunity costs. On the other hand, the RTM is typically a single-period market, whose clearing prices may not reflect intertemporal opportunity costs. Due to the time limitation in the real-time operation, real-time schedules are optimized by either a single-or multi-period problem, whose time frame varies from 5 minutes to 1 hour depending on the ISOs' tariffs. The existing RTM scheduling and pricing models are reviewed in Subsection III.A.
Under the existing market designs, the coordination between the DAM and RTM is weak in terms of scheduling and pricing. The DAM schedules are not considered in the RTM scheduling process. By relying on the information only in a short real-time time frame, the RTM schedules may impair reliability and efficiency, especially for inflexible generators, like oil or coal units, which require several hours to reach their full capacity as well as for large hydro-storage and limited energy resources, whose schedules need to be managed over the day.
Furthermore, the existing RTM prices can be inconsistent with the DAM prices. For example, unlike the DAM prices derived from a 24-hour clearing model, the RTM price in a peak hour may not account for the opportunity costs of ramping up a unit out of merit in the previous hours to meet the peak demand. Such RTM price would discourage dispatch-following incentives in the short run and undervalue flexible resources used to meet peak loads in the long run as pointed out in [6] 1 .
Although there exists a large body of literature on the multiperiod scheduling models, there are few publications that examine the scheduling coordination between a forward market and RTM, the linkage between forward market prices and RTM prices, as well as the impact of RTM pricing/settlement schemes on dispatch following incentives.
We propose a new pricing model that coordinates the realtime prices with forward prices to better reflect opportunity costs, and provides better dispatch-following incentives. In addition, we propose a coordinated scheduling framework that ensures efficient and reliable system operation as well as is practical for real-world implementations. In the following, we examine the prior work on RTM scheduling and pricing first, and then present the contributions of this paper.
A. Prior work
1) The myopic approach The myopic approach in the RTM is the real-time singleperiod economic dispatch that minimizes the cost of meeting load over a 5-or 10-minute period, without considering the cost or the system's ability of meeting demand in future dispatch intervals. As a result, system operators might have to take manual actions to adjust dispatch solutions to accommodate expected future conditions. Such manual actions are subjective and can be suboptimal or even infeasible. In addition, market clearing prices generated based on a single-period model are often inconsistent with manual actions, creating disincentives for units to follow their dispatch instructions, and subsequently increasing the need for out-of-market payments.
2) The multi-period approach Multi-period market clearing models have been drawing much attention because of their capability of optimizing the system with a set of intertemporal constraints across several time intervals. A few ISOs in the U.S. have implemented multiperiod dispatch in the RTM [7]- [9] . i) Challenges of existing multi-period scheduling models Various multi-period scheduling models have been extensively studied with the objectives of improving dispatch efficiency and reliability, e.g. [10] - [13] etc. However, when the market coupling involves many market intervals, these models are seldom adopted in a 5-minute RTM due to its computationally challenging. For instance, if the efficient scheduling of a unit with limited fuel storage requires the consideration of all market periods in the operating day, the multi-period model would have 288 five-minute dispatch periods with detailed information on system conditions such as generator availability, load forecast and transmission topology etc. For a real-world power system, which has at least tens of thousands of decision variables for each dispatch period, this large-scale multi-period scheduling model is impractical as the 3 real-time scheduling must be solved very quickly to provide a solution every five minutes. Therefore, a tradeoff has to be made between the look-ahead duration and operational reliability of the real-time operation. The look-ahead horizon of the multi-period real-time economic dispatch used in New York and California ISOs is typically set at one hour. Alternatively, the time resolution is increased to reduce the number of dispatch periods in the multi-period scheduling model at the expense of the model accuracy. Either way, operational efficiency and reliability are compromised.
ii) Challenges of existing multi-period pricing models Under the multi-period market clearing, the value of a dispatch decision in a time interval will affect the values of dispatch actions in other time intervals due to the intertemporal constraints. For instance, if a resource has to forego profit in the current dispatch interval to meet system future needs due to its intertemporal limitations, it incurs a lost opportunity cost, as recognized in [14] and [15] . However, the current market design does not have an efficient pricing or settlement mechanism for a resource to recover its intertemporal opportunity cost via market clearing prices. Consequently, resources are compelled to internalize their opportunity costs in the bids and offers, but estimating opportunity costs is a challenging task as pointed out in [16] .
Therefore, it is important to develop an efficient pricing scheme that is able to properly reflect the impact of intertemporal constraints in the market clearing prices. The existing work can be categorized into three types, namely the first-period only settlement, the multi-settlement, and the priorcost based pricing. These pricing approaches all focus on the RTM, but do not exploit the connection between the DAM and RTM.  Under the first-period only settlement, a multi-period pricing problem is run at each market clearing. Only the first-period is settled, and the prices for the later periods are advisory and not financially binding [17] . This approach has been used in New York ISO [7] and California ISO [8] . However, because the opportunity costs are embedded in the advisory intervals and never settled upon, as noted in [14] , the market participants may have incentive to deviate from dispatch instructions, decreasing the operational efficiency.  Unlike the first-period only settlement approach, all the periods are financially binding under the multi-settlement approach [18] . However, because the multi-settlement approach considers the past dispatch decisions irrelevant to price determination, the resulting prices do not necessarily accurately reflect the total costs of serving the load. Consequently, this approach can potentially distort dispatch-following incentives in the short run as shown in [14] , as well as fail to send right investment signals in the long run.  The prior-cost based pricing method in [19] and [20] incorporates the costs associated with the past dispatch decisions, and then determines prices by re-optimizing the social welfare for the entire look-ahead time horizon [19] or the remainder of the time horizon [20] . Only the first interval is settled. This approach is shown to alleviate the dispatch-following incentive issue in real time. However, if the RTM look-ahead time horizon is long, e.g. several hours or a day, the prior-cost based approach would be impractical because it is very computationally challenging to solve such large-scale problems in the real-time operation.
B. Contributions
To address the issue with the weak coordination between the forward and RTM under the existing approaches, we propose a two-level multi-period market design that strengthens the coordination between these two markets. The tight coordination helps to achieve economic efficiency, reliability and dispatchfollowing incentives. In addition, the proposed market design also addresses the computational issues associated with the existing RTM multi-period market scheduling and pricing models. In particular, at the upper level or the forward market, a full multi-period model with a long look-ahead horizon is solved to determine the optimal schedules and prices as well as opportunity costs for intertemporal constrained resources under the forecasted system condition. At the lower level or the RTM, the full look-ahead time horizon is truncated into a shorter time horizon at each market clearing in order to reduce computational burden as well as simplify the settlement process. The lower-level scheduling model uses the upper-level scheduling solutions as a trajectory to guide scheduling, achieving economic efficiency and meeting system reliability. The lower-level pricing model incorporates the intertemporal opportunity costs estimated in the upper level market. The incorporation of the opportunity cost will not only maintain the consistency of prices between the upper and lower level markets, providing much needed dispatch-following incentives, but also remove the requirement of adopting long look-ahead periods in the RTM, reducing the implementation effort. The proposed scheduling model is similar to the concept of ramping envelopes proposed in PJM [21] [22] . The logic behind ramping envelopes is to use the scheduling trajectory provided by a real-time look-ahead problem as a baseline and create a dispatchable range around it for the real-time single-period dispatch problem. However, different from the proposed market design, there is no pricing scheme developed to reflect the impact of ramping envelopes in clearing prices. As a result, dispatch-following incentives are not ensured. Furthermore, ramping envelops are designed specifically for managing ramp issues, but they are not as general as the proposed scheduling model, which can handle a wide variety of intertemporal constraints.
The proposed pricing model can be distinguished from [20] from two perspectives. First, [20] investigates the RTM pricing model in isolation whereas the proposed model considers both the DAM and the RTM, leading to improvement in efficiency and reliability. Second, the proposed pricing model can be considered as an evolution of [20] for its flexibility to cover a spectrum of deployment time frames without scarifying computational efficiency, economic efficiency and dispatchfollowing incentives, making it more practical and general than [20] .
Under the proposed market design, a multi-settlement system is adopted for settling each market clearing, reducing market participants' risk exposure. The mechanism of this multi-settlement system is similar to the multi-settlement pricing approach proposed in [18] . However, we want to underscore that unlike the multi-settlement pricing approach, the clearing prices produced under the proposed market design more accurately reflect the load serving costs, which in turn induce dispatch-following incentives.
The specific contributions of this paper are the following: a. We develop a practical multi-period market clearing model for scheduling and pricing of electricity markets with intertemporal constraints. Under, the proposed approach, there is no need for the ISOs to make tradeoffs between computational efficiency and operational reliability. b. This is the first paper that considers the coordination between a forward market and RTM under the multiperiod paradigm. The incorporation of opportunity costs in the lower-level pricing scheme makes the real-time prices more closely reflect the load serving cost, maintaining the pricing consistency between the forward prices and real-time prices. It also reduces the need of participants incorporating the opportunity cost in their bids and offers. c. The proposed pricing scheme provides proper dispatchfollowing incentives, and the proposed scheduling scheme produces economically efficient dispatch results under the perfect forecast conditions. Other properties of the proposed scheme are also studied under the imperfect forecast conditions. d. We apply the proposed scheme to ESRs, and its advantages in terms of economic efficiency, reliability and dispatch-following incentives are demonstrated with the numerical studies. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The proposed two-level market clearing model as well as its properties are presented in Section IV. The proposed model is applied to ESRs in Section V. Numerical analysis is performed to demonstrate the advantages of the proposed model in Section VI. The paper is concluded in Section VII.
IV. THE PROPOSED TWO-LEVEL MULTI-PERIOD MARKET

CLEARING FRAMEWORK
Under the proposed scheme, the upper-level market, or the forward market, takes place at 0 t , as illustrated in Fig 1. A multi-period model is solved to meet the forecasted system condition at the upper-level planning time horizon, and simultaneously generates the upper-level clearing quantities and prices for each time period. It also obtains intertemporal opportunity costs for each resource under the forecasted system condition.
The lower-level market, or the RTM, has a shorter lookahead time horizon, which is called sub time horizon, and clears on a rolling basis. Each market clearing results in a set of cleared quantities together with a set of corresponding prices. The cleared quantities and prices are settled after each market clearing under a multi-settlement system. The shorter time horizon at the lower level is able to reduce computational burden as well as simplify the settlement process. In order to compensate the narrower vision of the lower-level problems, the upper-level schedules are utilized to guide the proposed scheduling model at the lower level. The intertemporal opportunity costs are incorporated into the lower-level pricing model to maintain the consistency of prices between the upper and lower level markets, providing much needed dispatchfollowing incentives.
Even though the upper-level forecast may not be perfect, it can still be argued that the upper-level solution is the best possible solution given system operators' beliefs. The lowerlevel scheduling and pricing problems are designed to follow the upper-level scheduling and price trajectories, and at the same time it is left with the freedom to adjust schedules and prices the best way it can in the sub time horizon given the newly revealed information.
Figure 1: Two-level multi-period market clearing framework
In the rest of this section, we present the stylized mathematical models for the proposed two-level market clearing framework, and discuss its properties. In addition, the multi-settlement system is described.
A. The upper-level market 1) The upper-level market clearing model
The upper-level multi-period market clearing model can be cast as the following linear programming problem 2 :
The objective of the multi-period problem (1) is to minimize the overall production cost across the entire time horizon (2) represents the intertemporal constraints 3 . Constraint (3) is the system-level timeindependent constraint, representing the energy balance, reserve requirement and transmission constraints. Constraint (4) represents time-independent constraints at the individual resource level, e.g. resources' operational capacity.
We use the superscript u to denote the optimal primal and dual solutions to the upper-level problem (1) 
2) Properties of the upper-level market clearing model
In this subsection, we discuss the properties of the upperlevel market clearing results.
First, let us take a look at the efficiency of the upper-level market. Consider the profit maximization problem of a pricetaking resource i under the clearing price
Based on the definition in [23] , the clearing quantity Property 1 can be easily proved by matching the KKT conditions of the upper-level overall problem (1)-(4) with the KKT conditions of each individual profit maximization problem (5)- (7) as well as the market clearing condition (3). We omit the details here.
Next, consider the Lagrangian function of the profit maximization problem (5)- (7):
is the Lagrangian multipliers for (8) . Therefore, by the firstorder condition, we have ax b ax   , representing the restriction of the total outputs during a time duration due to the storage, fuel or emission limitations. The LEG constraint can be reformulated in the form of Constraint (2) by introducing auxiliary variables t y . The LEG constraint is equivalent to
, , , 1:
,
When , u it  is zero, resource i's output is not bounded, and the resource becomes a marginal resource. As a result, equation (9) can be written as follows:
Notice that u t LMP and , it c are no longer equal to each other in the time period t as is expected for a marginal resource in a single-period problem. This is because the cost , it c is not the true marginal costit is only the marginal production cost, e.g. the fuel cost. The true marginal cost is the right hand side of (10), including the marginal production cost , it c as well as the marginal opportunity cost , : 1 , , 1 , 1:
In particular, the marginal opportunity cost in the time period t is the foregone total profit of choosing one more unit production in that time period. The marginal profit in the time period t is the additional profit in the time period t of choosing one more unit of production in that time period. The marginal profit can be either positive (marginal gain) or negative (marginal loss). Equation (10) 
2) Properties of the lower-level market under the perfect forecast
In this subsection, we discuss the properties of the lowerlevel market clearing results if the upper-level forecast is accurate. 
s.t. 
3) Impact of uncertainty on the opportunity cost estimation and system feasibility
When the forecast of the uncertain parameter g is imperfect, the properties in the previous subsection do not necessarily hold. To obtain the actual opportunity costs, the ISO would have to frequently re-optimize the multi-period problem with the updated parameter g in the RTM, which is impractical and computationally challenging for a large power system. In practice, if the realization of the parameter g does not deviate significantly from the forecasted value, the offer adjustments can be considered as the estimations of the opportunity costs as indicated in Property 6 below. If the realization deviates significantly from the forecast value, then the estimations become inaccurate, re-optimization should be performed. Before presenting Property 6, we introduce two terms. The backward-looking marginal opportunity cost is how much the total profit of all the resources in the past time horizon would have changed if every resource is allowed to deviate its production at the current time by one more unit. The forwardlooking marginal opportunity cost is the total profit change in the future time horizon if every resource is allowed to deviate its production at the current time interval by one more unit. Opportunity cost is typically forward looking in that it measures the value that a resource sacrifices at the time the decision is made and beyond. We want to provide justifications for the backward-looking opportunity cost here. At any moment in time, a resource can look either forward or backward. One looks backward in time in a perspective of the alternative of leaving the market. One looks forward in time in a perspective of the alternative decisions to be made and the consequences of each. The goal of the ISO is to incentivize resources to follow the scheduling path for the entire time horizon 
The total profit of all the resources in the past time horizon is In general, a multi-settlement system is the settlement of a sequence of markets for a product that includes at least one forward market, in which buyers and sellers may conclude financial contracts for later delivery, and a RTM, which involves the actual delivery of the product.
Under the proposed framework, the clearing quantity of each time period t at the upper level is settled at the corresponding price: A benefit of the multi-settlement system is that it reduces risk exposure for market participants. The upper-level schedule is financially binding. The lower-level price is used only to settle the deviation from the previous market clearing. By locking in the upper-level market clearing prices, market participants are only exposed to the lower-level price volatility for the deviation quantity. 9 V. APPLICATION: DISPATCH AND PRICING OF ENERGY STORAGE The proposed two-level multi-period market clearing model can be easily applied to the scheduling and pricing for ESRs, whose temporal constraints play an important role in their optimal operation. In particular, the upper-level multi-period problem can be written as follows: , , , [26] , which studies the scheduling and pricing of ESRs in a continuous time domain. 10 
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In the numerical experiment, we consider a simple one-node system where three conventional generators and an ESR are dispatched to serve the load. The characteristics of each generator and the ESR are summarized in Table 1 . Gen1 is the cheapest generator whereas Gen3 is the most expensive one. For the ESR, its charging/discharging efficiency is assumed to be 1, i.e. 1 ee     for the sake of simplicity. The ESR can seamlessly go from charging and discharging. Its EcoMax represents its maximum discharging capability while its EcoMin represents its maximum charging capability. The initial SOC level of the ESR is assumed to be at the half of its maximum SOC as reported in Table 1 The full time horizon consists of 8 time periods. The upperlevel forecasted load profile is plotted in Figure 2 , where there are two peaks occurring at t5 and t8. Table 2 summarizes the clearing results of the upper-level problem. The ESR charges to its full SOC capacity at t1, and remains idle until the first peak load at t5, when it fully discharges. After that, the ESR charges at t6 and t7, when the load is relatively low. Finally, the ESR fully discharges at the last time period, since any remaining SOC would be worthless afterwards.
Time Gen1 Gen2 Gen3 ESR SOC (MWh) LMP ($/MWh) Output (MW)  t1  30  0  0  -6  12  10  t2  40  6  0  0  12  63  t3  40  30  0  0  12  63  t4  40  40  3  0  12  100  t5  40  40  6  12  0  100  t6  40  29  0  -9  9  63  t7  40  40  0  -3  12  63  t8  40  40  10  12 0 100 
Case A: Lower-level market clearing under the perfect forecast
In this case, it is assumed that the actual realized load is the same as the forecasted load as shown in Figure 2 . A sub time horizon at the lower level contains three time periods. Figure 3. illustrates the lower-level scheduling and pricing processes, which utilize the upper-level schedules and shadow prices of the SOC constraints. The lower-level ESR schedules and market clearing prices are consistent with the upper-level counterparts in Table 1 as claimed in Properties 3 and 5. In this case, the realized load at the lower level can be different from the upper-level forecasted value. We consider the following five approaches: 1) the myopic approach, 2) the proposed approach, 3) Hogan's approach [19] , 4) Hua's approach [20] , and 5) the after-fact perfect dispatch/pricing approach.
The myopic approach solves a single-period problem at each market clearing. The resulting primal and dual solutions are used for dispatch instructions and to set prices. Under Hogan's approach, the pricing problem at each market clearing relaxes the system balance constraints in the past time horizon in the full multi-period problem, sets the multipliers to be the past LMPs, and optimizes the resulting Lagrangian function. Its scheduling problem re-optimizes the multi-period problem for the remainder of the time horizon, rather than the entire lookahead horizon. Unlike Hogan's approach, Hua's approach relaxes the binding intertemporal constraints that links the past and current time horizons and sets the multipliers to be the corresponding shadow prices obtained in the previous pricing run. Its scheduling problem is the same as the one under Hogan's approach. Both Hogan's and Hua's approaches require re-optimizing multi-period problems across the entire or rest time horizon, which can be computationally burdensome for a long look-ahead horizon whereas the myopic and proposed approaches are considered to be more practical. Under the perfect approach, the dispatch and LMPs are determined by the primal and dual solutions to the multi-period problem (35)-(41) for the entire time horizon under the realized load. The perfect approach is used as a benchmark for comparing the performance of the other alternatives.
Under each approach, we perform the scheduling and pricing runs to meet 100 randomly realized load scenarios, which uniformly deviate from the forecasted load within  5% range.
Under each approach, the penalty price for energy imbalance is set to be $1000. We compare the alternative approaches in terms of the following aspects:
(a) Social surplus (SS): SS is a measurement of economic efficiency of a scheduling scheme. The larger SS is, the more economically efficient a dispatch scheme is. SS equals the sum of the conventional generators' producer surplus (PS), t1  t2  t3  t4  t5  t6  t7  t8  t1  t2  t3  t4  t5  t6  t7  t8 Shadow prices of the SOC constraints
If the LOC of a resource is equal to zero, it means that the market clearing scheme provides dispatch-following incentives. On the other hand, a large LOC implies that the LMP is either too high (or too low), which might lead to the resource generating more (or less) than the dispatch instructions. Table 3 compares five approaches in terms of the means of ESRS, CS, PS and SS. Among all the approaches, the myopic approach benefits the conventional producers most, but results in the lowest CS. On the other hand, the proposed method is the most favorable for consumers. This is consistent with the results in Figure 4 , where the myopic approach has the highest number of imbalance instances (or load shedding) whereas the propose approach results in the least. In terms of ESRS, Hua's approach benefits ESRs most whereas the myopic approach leads to almost zero welfare for ESRs because ESRs are dispatched at 0 MW in most time under the myopic approach. The means of ESRS, CS and PS under Hogan's approach match the perfect approach better than the other approaches. Since the same scheduling problem is used under Hua's and Hogan's approach, they result in the same SS, which is independent on LMPs as shown in equation (44). Furthermore, SS under the proposed approach is higher than the myopic approach. This implies the dispatch solutions obtained by the proposed approach are more economically efficient then the myopic solutions.
ESRS To understand the impact of the duration of the lower-level sub time horizon on the economic efficiency under the proposed approach, we compare SS mean under different durations of S . Table 4 summarizes the results. The longer the look-ahead horizon is, the more economically efficient the proposed approach is. However, the economic efficiency growth slows down after the duration of the sub time horizon reaches 3 time periods. Notice that even when the proposed approach solves a single-time period problem, i.e. number of time periods equal to 1, the resulting SS is higher than the myopic counterpart in Table 3 due to the fact that the proposed lower-level schedule takes into consideration of the past and future schedules.
Number Next, we compare the approaches in terms of power imbalance instances, which are plotted in Figure 4 . It can be observed that more than 80 imbalance instances occur under the myopic approach. This demonstrates a major reliability disadvantage of the myopic approach due to ignoring the reliability needs for future market intervals. On the other hand, the imbalance instances are comparable among the rest of the approaches. This means that the proposed approach is reliable. Table 5 summarizes the mean of LOC under the alternative approaches. The perfect approach yields no LOC, which is expected as its schedules and prices constitute a competitive equilibrium as indicated by Property 1, which implies strong dispatch-following incentives. Setting aside the perfect approach, Hogan's approach results in the least total LOC whereas the myopic approach leads to the highest total LOC. Although dispatch-following incentive under the proposed approach is not as strong as compared to Hua's and Hogan's approaches, it is a significant improvement of the myopic approach.
Figure 4: Comparison on imbalance instances
ESR 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a two-level multi-period market clearing scheme is proposed for scheduling and pricing of a power system constrained by intertemporal linkages. Compare to the Hogan perfect state-of-the-art multi-period approaches, the proposed scheme is innovative for being the first considering the simultaneous pricing and scheduling coordination between a forward and real-time markets. The tight coordination allows the proposed scheme to be able to improve computational efficiency, reliability, economic efficiency, and load-following incentives simultaneously whereas the existing methods have to make tradeoffs among these properties. Furthermore, the proposed models consider a general form, rather than being customized for a specific type of intertemporal constraints. These advantages make the proposed scheme practical, generic and flexible to be applied to a wide spectrum of market timeframes as well as to various resource types.
Compared to the existing myopic method, the dispatch instructions generated by the proposed scheme are more economically efficient and reliable. The market clearing prices of the proposed scheme provide better dispatch-following incentives because the opportunity cost is taken into consideration in the pricing. These advantages of the proposed multi-period scheme are demonstrated in numerical experiments.
